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Toward Contractual Choice in Marriage
J. MARK RAMSEYER"
I. THE LOGIC:
,4. Introduction
A fine, eminently sensible idea, this Rasmusen-Stake proposal: at the time of
marriage, let couples choose from among an array of contracts that offer different
grounds for divorce.' To see why it makes such good sense, posit two firms, an
automobile assembler and a headlight maker. So long as the assembler buys
1960s-vintage, round, standard-issue headlights from the headlight maker,
neither firm will care much about the duration of their contract. If the assembler
decides to buy its headlights elsewhere, the headlight maker can find other
outlets. If the headlight maker decides to sell to a rival assembler, the assembler
can find other suppliers.
Now suppose that the assembler wants a 1990s-vintage, distinctively shaped,
sealed-beam headlight. In order for the headlight maker to produce this peculiar
headlight, suppose further that someone will need to invest heavily in headlight-
making equipment that can be used only for making this distinctive headlight. To
those involved, the duration of their contract will now matter dramatically.
Absent some assurance that it will receive compensation if the other side
defaults, neither will invest in the equipment.
Rewritten for marriages, this is Rasmusen-Stake's point. Some couples will not
want to invest heavily in their marriage. Two lawyers may marry, but want to
continue billing their 2500 hours each at Skadden, Arps. Quintessential yuppies,
they will eat out routinely and hire others to clean the house, water the plants,
and walk the parakeet. Although current law allows only at-will, penalty-clause-
less marriages, for them such a regime works fine. Either of them can leave the
other at the drop of a hat, granted. But because both are protecting their market
wage and neither is investing heavily in the marriage, in the grand scheme of
things neither will suffer much from divorce.
Other couples will want very different arrangements. Just as there are gains to
specialization in most economic activities, some couples will want to specialize
in complementary activities within the marriage? Suppose one of them (usually,
it seems to be the wife) wants to leave the market and focus on household
production. She will quit Skadden and-if they have children-fire their nanny
and raise them herself.
* Harold J. & Marion F. Green Professor of International Legal Studies, The University
of Chicago. I gratefully acknowledge the helpful suggestions of Eric Rasmusen and Jeffrey
Stake.
1. See Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifling the Veil ofIgnorance: Personalizing
the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453 (1998).
2. On the gains to specialization within marriage, see GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON
THE FAMILY 30-53 (rev. & enlarged ed. 1991).
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For couples who want such specialized arrangements, modem at-will marriage
law is a disaster. She is dropping out of the labor market (a move that will
dramatically lower her market value should she later choose to return). She is
investing in skills specific to the relationship (skills that will be worthless should
they-divorce). Yet for taking these risks, modem at-will marriage law offers her
nothing.
Before placing themselves in such a precarious position, many wives
understandably want some protection. For the sake of her household, she may
want to take (and her husband may want her to take) these risks. Before she does
so, though, she will justifiably want to have (and to induce her to take these risks,
he may reasonably want to give her) some recourse against him should he divorce
her unilaterally. Under the old American divorce law, she had considerable
protection-since if he left her for another woman (or on other grounds
constituting fault) he had to pay alimony. Under Islamic law, according to
Elisabeth M. Landes, she likewise might have had considerable protection-since
if he unilaterally divorced her he sometimes had to pay a large penalty? Under
modem American law, even if both spouses want her to have the protection and
even if both spouses explicitly agree to protective clauses, many courts will
refuse to enforce their arrangement.
B. Consequences
The consequences of this modem legal regime are straightforward. If people
can mike only at-will marriage contracts, then they will invest less in assets
specific to the marriage, and fewer people will specialize within marriage in
household activities. Couples will have fewer children, in other words, and fewer
parents (usually mothers) will stay home to care for those they have. On the
margin, children will be less attractive investments to the husband-because with
his marriage fragile he has lower odds of being there to enjoy them. On the
margin, they will also be less attractive investments to the wife-because with
her marriage uncertain she runs a large risk of raising them alone, with all the
economic, social, and psychological costs that entails.
These incentives have direct, real world effects. All else held constant, one
would expect modem liberalized divorce rules both to increase the number of
women who stay in the labor market during marriage, and to decrease the
number of children they have. Consistent with that prediction, Margaret Brinig
and Steven Crafton find that because of the law, couples are not having the
children they would otherwise prefer to have.5 As the law imposes no penalty on
at-fault spouses at divorce, they also find that they suffer increased spousal
3. See Elisabeth M. Landes, Economics ofAlimony, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 38-39 (1978);
see also BECKER, supra note 2, at 14.
4. On the effect of no-fault divorce on the labor-force participation of women, compare
Allen M. Parkman, Unilateral Divorce and the Labor-Force Participation Rates of Married
Women, Revisited, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 671 (1992), with H. Elizabeth Peters, Marriage and
Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 437 (1986).
5. See Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J. LEGAL
STuD. 869 (1994).
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abuse. All this is not abstract theory. It directly affects the way real people live
their very real lives.
The Rasmusen-Stake proposal would substantially mitigate these problems.
Instead of a single marriage contract mandatory for all, it would introduce
choice. Under the proposal, those couples who wanted an at-will marriage could
choose the current regime. Those who wanted to specialize in complementary
skills could choose one that made divorce harder. To its credit, the proposal does
this without significantly raising the administrative costs of either marriage or
divorce.
II. DIVORCE LAW AND DIVORCE RATES
A. No Direct Effect
The effect that the Rasmusen-Stake proposal would have on divorce rates bears
directly on its social benefits. Although it would indeed lower the divorce rate,
it would not primarily do so directly. It would not, in other words, primarily do
so by locking couples into undesirable marriages. People who think they would
be better off divorced than married will divorce, whether under at-will marriage
or under the Rasmusen-Stake durable-marriage option. Instead, the Rasmusen-
Stake proposal lowers the divorce rate by raising the relative quality of
marriage-by increasing the returns that people earn from marriage relative to
divorce.
To explore these issues, in this, as in much of the law, one can do no better
than to start with Gary Becker.6 As Becker pointed out years ago, making divorce
harder does not directly reduce its incidence. Provided transaction costs are
sufficiently low, whether divorce is easy or hard a couple will divorce if but only
if their combined welfare is higher under divorce than under marriage.! Whether
divorce is easy or hard, as Elizabeth Peters puts it, "divorce will occur only when
the joint value of marriage is less than the sum of each spouse's value from
getting divorced."'
To see this, take two polar legal regimes: one where either spouse can
unilaterally leave on a whim (call it At-Will Marriage), and one where the couple
6. See generally BECKER, supra note 2; Gary S. Becker et al., An Economic Analysis of
Marital Instability, 85 J. POL. EcoN. 1141 (1977).
7. The theoretical point here is not disputed, at least within the law-and-economics
community. There has been empirical debate, however, over how large the transaction costs
(and any other potential impediments to negotiation) are, and whether they are large enough
to have a noticeable effect on divorce rates. See generally BECKER, supra note 2, at 333-35
(arguing that no-fault divorce has only temporary effect on divorce rate); Peters, supra note 4
(stating that no-fault does not affect divorce rates); H. Elizabeth Peters, Marriage and Divorce:
Reply, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 686 (1992) (same). But see Douglas W. Allen, Marriage and
Divorce: Comment, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 679 (1992) (arguing that no-fault does increase divorce
rates); Martin Zelder, Inefficient Dissolutions as a Consequence of Public Goods: The Case
of No-Fault Divorce, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (1993) (same).
8. Peters, supra note 7, at 690 (emphasis in original).
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can divorce only if one of the spouses has committed specified acts of fault (call
it Hard Divorce). Now consider several cases. First, suppose that both spouses
individually decide they would rather be divorced than married. Under At-Will
Marriage, they will obviously divorce. However, under Hard Divorce they will
too. A little perjury goes a long way, and they will simply fake fault.
Second, suppose that both spouses individually decide that they would rather
stay married than divorce. Obviously again, whether under At-Will Marriage or
Hard Divorce, they will stay married.
Third, suppose that a husband decides he would rather divorce, his wife
decides she would rather stay married, and the amount by which he improves his
welfare through divorce exceeds the amount by which her welfare falls through
divorce. Under At-Will Marriage, he will petition for divorce, and nothing she
can do will convince him otherwise. Under Hard Divorce they will likewise
divorce, again by faking fault.
Although whether the couple divorces here does not depend on the legal
regime, the property each spouse keeps does. "[D]ivorce occurs when it is
efficient," explains Elizabeth Peters, "but the compensation scheme depends on
the divorce law."9 Under Hard Divorce, the husband cannot leave his wife
unilaterally. Instead, because he needs her complicity in filing a fault-based
divorce petition, he must first make divorce worth her while. He can
advantageously do this, because (by hypothesis) divorce improves his welfare
more than it hurts hers. He will pay, she will agree, and the two will divorce.
Because a divorcing husband must make this side payment, however, under
Hard Divorce a wife dramatically reduces the risk of specializing in household
activity. Under At-Will Marriage, if her husband wants to divorce, he simply
leaves. She may have left the labor market and invested heavily in marriage-
specific skills, but no matter. She receives nothing. Under Hard Divorce, he will
leave her only if he first pays her enough to make it worth her while.'"
Fourth, suppose that a husband decides he wants to divorce, his wife decides
she would rather stay married, but the amount by which he improves his welfare
through divorce is less than the amount by which her welfare falls. Under Hard
Divorce, they will stay married. Although he would like to divorce, he cannot
obtain a divorce unless she agrees. Given the relative effects of divorce on the
two, he cannot advantageously pay her enough to buy her consent.
Under At-Will Marriage, they will likewise stay married. Crucially, however,
because he can divorce unilaterally she will now have to bribe him (whether
financially or otherwise) not to leave. Because divorce hurts her more than it
helps him, she will find that it pays to induce him not to divorce. Whether under
At-Will Marriage or Hard Divorce, if the combined welfare of the two is higher
under marriage than under divorce they will remain married-but under At-Will
Marriage she will have to pay him to stay.
9. Peters, supra note 4, at 452-53.
10. Critics object that he can also leave by abusing her so badly that she finds marriage
intolerable-indeed, this is a point Becker himself made. See Gary S. Becker & Kevin M.
Murphy, The Family and the State, 31 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 14 (1988). While the danger of abuse
is a problem to be sure, it is one the law can substantially mitigate by making abuse itself
grounds for which she can demand high levels of alimony.
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B. Changes to Investments
Notwithstanding this logic, divorce law does change the divorce rate, but it
changes it by altering the investments people make in their marriages. As just
explained, although the law does not directly and substantially affect whether
people divorce, it does affect whether and how money changes hands upon
divorce. If divorce is hard, a spouse wanting a divorce must bribe the spouse who
wants to stay married; if it is easy, a spouse wanting to keep a marriage must
bribe the spouse who wants to divorce.
Given these financial ramifications, Hard Divorce directly facilitates
specialization within marriage. Suppose a spouse (usually the wife) wants to
specialize in nonmarket activities or invest in marriage-specific skills. Under a
Hard Divorce regime, she can do so with the knowledge that her husband cannot
unilaterally divorce her. Because specialization is safer under Hard Divorce than
under At-Will Marriage, on the margin more couples will find it advantageous.
Again, on the margin, if he cannot leave her without buying her acquiescence,
she will be more likely to quit her outside job and invest in activities that have
their highest value within the marriage.
C. The Consequences for Divorce Rates
These different investment patterns will in turn affect the relative benefits from
marriage and divorce. Suppose a wife invests heavily in marriage-specific skills.
She and her husband will now earn returns from those investments, and
(importantly) those returns are ones they will earn only if they stay married. Had
she stayed in the labor market, they would earn returns there too, of course. But
those returns are ones she earns whether or not they stay married. That she chose
to specialize in household activities, moreover, necessarily also implies that she
and her husband valued those activities above her market wage.
These returns to specialization lower the divorce rate. Recall that whether a
couple divorces depends on whether they earn higher combined returns in or out
of marriage. Yet, the more heavily they invest in household production, the more
likely they will find themselves better off married than divorced. After all, the
longer she stays out of the labor market, the lower her wages when she returns
upon divorce; the more she invests in marriage-specific assets, the higher the
returns they earn from marriage. Specialization makes marriages more durable,
in short, by raising the returns to marriage relative to divorce."
II. See Robert A. Pollak, A Transaction Cost Approach to Families and Households, 23
L ECON. LITERATURE 581, 601 (1985). Compare Parkman, supra note 4 (recognizing that no-
fault divorce has increased the number of married women in the workforce, but arguing that
the increase is due to a lack of compensation at divorce for a married woman's reduced earning
capacity), with Peters, supra note 4 (arguing that no-fault divorce causes an increase in the
number of married women in the workforce because married women are not compensated at
divorce for marriage-specific investments).
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11. THE BENEFITS
Given all this, the social benefits to the Rasmusen-Stake proposal are
straightforward. Not all couples would benefit from Hard Divorce. After all,
some couples will both prefer to invest heavily in market skills. Under the
Rasmusen-Stake proposal, they are free to choose At-Will Marriage.
Other couples would prefer to specialize within marriage. Under the present
divorce regime, they cannot safely do so. Under the Rasmusen-Stake proposal,
they could. Having chosen it, they would then build marriages that are, all else
equal, more durable than the marriages of those who invest instead in labor-
market skills.
Ultimately, the Rasmusen-Stake proposal simply expands contractual choice
in marriage. It mandates nothing. Yet, by expanding the choice couples face, it
directly facilitates more enduring marriages among people (and only those
people) who self-consciously want to make more enduring commitments, and
more stay-at-home parents among those (and only those) who self-consciously
want to stay at home.
Children are the obvious winners. To be sure, we can all think of marriages
that are better off dead than alive, and of nannies who provide better care than
some mothers and fathers. Exceptions notwithstanding, however, children
usually benefit both from more durable marriages, and from greater parental
attention. Children born to parents who choose the Rasmusen-Stake Hard
Divorce option will-on average, and all else equal-have both.
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